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a b s t r a c t
We consider a process called the Group Network Formation Game, which represents the
scenario when strategic agents are building a network together. In our game, agents can
have extremely varied connectivity requirements, and attempt to satisfy those require-
ments by purchasing links in the network. We show a variety of results about equilibrium
properties in such games, including the fact that the price of stability is 1 when all nodes
in the network are owned by players, and that doubling the number of players creates an
equilibrium as good as the optimum centralized solution. For the general case, we show
the existence of a 2-approximate Nash equilibrium that is as good as the centralized opti-
mum solution, as well as how to compute good approximate equilibria in polynomial time.
Our results essentially imply that for a variety of connectivity requirements, giving agents
more freedom can paradoxically result in more efficient outcomes.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Manymodern computer networks, including the Internet itself, are constructed andmaintained by self-interested agents.
This makes network design a fundamental problem for which it is important to understand the effects of strategic behavior.
Modeling and understanding of the evolution of nonphysical networks created by many heterogeneous agents (like social
networks, viral networks, etc.) as well as physical networks (like computer networks, transportation networks, etc.) has
been studied extensively in the last several years. In networks constructed by several self-interested agents, the global
performance of the system may not be as good as in the case where a central authority can simply dictate a solution;
rather, we need to understand the quality of solutions that are consistent with self-interested behavior. Much research
in the theoretical computer science community has focused on this performance gap and specifically on the notions of the
price of anarchy and the price of stability— the ratios between the costs of theworst and best Nash equilibrium,2 respectively,
and that of the globally optimal solution.
In this paper, we study a network design game that we call the Group Network Formation Game, which captures the
essence of strategic agents building a network together. In this game, players correspond to nodes of a graph (although not
all nodes need to correspond to players), and the players can have extremely varied connectivity requirements. For example,
there might be several different ‘‘types’’ of nodes in the graph, and a player desires to connect to at least one of every type
(so that this player’s connected component forms a Group Steiner Tree [13]). Or instead, a player might want to connect to
at least k other player nodes. The first example above is useful for many applications where a set of players attempt to form
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 518 2768988; fax: +1 518 2764033.
E-mail addresses: eanshel@cs.rpi.edu (E. Anshelevich), caskurlu@gmail.com (B. Caskurlu).
1 Tel.: +1 518 2766491; fax: +1 518 2764033.
2 Recall that a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium is a solution where no single player can switch her strategy and become better off, given that the other
players keep their strategies fixed.
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groups with ‘‘complementary’’ qualities. The second example corresponds to a network of servers where each server want
to be connected to at least k other servers so that it can have a backup of its data; or in the context of IP networks, a set of
ISPs that want to increase the reliability of the Internet connection for their customers, and so decide to formmulti-homing
connections through k other ISPs [23]. Many other types of connectivity requirements fit into our framework, and so the
results we give in this paper will be relevant to many different types of network problems.
Game definition. Wenow formally define the Group Network Formation Game as follows. Let an undirected graph G = (V , E)
be given, with each edge e having a nonnegative cost c(e). This graph represents the possible edges that can be built. Each
player i corresponds to a single node in this graph (that we call a player or terminal node), which we will also denote by
i. Similarly to [4], a strategy of player i is a payment vector pi of size |E|, where pi(e) is how much player i is offering to
contribute to the cost of edge e. We say that an edge e is bought, i.e., it is included in the network, if the sum of payments
of all the players for e is at least as much as the cost of e (
∑
i pi(e) ≥ c(e)). Let Gp denote the subgraph of bought edges
corresponding to the strategy vector p = (p1, . . . , pN). Gp is the outcome of this game, since it is the network which is
purchased by the players.
To define the utilities/costs of the players, we must consider their connectivity requirements. Group Network Formation
Game considers the class of problems where the players’ connectivity requirements can be compactly represented with a
function F : 2U → {0, 1}, where U ⊆ V is the set of player nodes, similar to [14]. This function F has the followingmeaning.
If S is a set of terminals, then F(S) = 1 if and only if the connectivity requirements of all players in S would be satisfied if
S is the set of terminals of a connected component in Gp. For the example above, where each player wants to connect to at
least one player from each ‘‘type", the function F(S)would evaluate to 1 exactly when S contains at least one player of each
type. Similarly, for the ‘‘data backup" example above, the function F(S)would evaluate to 1 exactly when S contains at least
k+ 1 players. In general, we will assume that the connectivity requirements of the players are represented by a monotone
‘‘happiness" function F . The monotonicity means that F(B) ≥ F(A) when B contains A. This implies that if the connectivity
requirement of a player is satisfied in a graph Gp, then it is still satisfied when this player is connected to a superset of the
nodes she is connected to in Gp. We will call a set of player nodes S a ‘‘happy" group if F(S) = 1. While not all connectivity
requirements can be represented as such a function, it is a reasonably general class that includes the examples given above.
Therefore an instance of our game consists of a graph G = (V , E), player nodes U ⊆ V , and a function F that states the
connectivity requirements of the players. We will say that player i’s connectivity requirement is satisfied in Gp if and only if
F(Si(Gp)) = 1 for Si(Gp) being the terminals of i’s connected component in Gp. While required to connect to a set of terminal
nodes satisfying her connectivity requirement, each player also tries to minimize her total payments,
∑
e∈E pi(e) (which we
will denote by |pi|). We conclude the definition of our game by defining the cost function for each player i as:
– cost(i) = ∞ if F(Si(Gp)) = 0
– cost(i) = |pi| otherwise.
In our game, all players want to be a part of a happy group which can correspond to many connectivity requirements,
some of which are mentioned above. The socially optimal solution (which we denote by OPT) for this game is the cheapest
possible network where every connected component is a happy group, since this is the solutionmaximizing social welfare.3
For our first example above, OPT corresponds to the cheapest forest where every component is a Group Steiner Tree, for
the second to the Terminal Backup problem [5], and in general it can correspond to a variety of constrained forest problems
[14]. Our goals include understanding the quality of exact and approximate Nash equilibria by comparing them to OPT, and
thereby understanding the efficiency gap that results because of the players’ self-interest. By studying the price of stability,
we also seek to reduce this gap, as the best Nash equilibrium can be thought of as the best outcome possible if we were able
to suggest a solution to all the players simultaneously.
In the Group Network Formation Game, we do not assume the existence of a central authority that designs and maintains
the network, and decides on appropriate cost-shares for each player. Instead we use a cost-sharing scheme which is
sometimes referred to as ‘‘arbitrary cost sharing" [4,11] that permits the players to specify the actual amount of payment for
each edge. This cost-sharing mechanism is necessary in scenarios where very little control over the players is available, and
gives more freedom to players in specifying their strategies, i.e., has a much larger strategy space. The main advantage of
such amodel is that the players havemore freedom in their choices, and less control is required over them. A disadvantage of
such a system, however, is that it does not guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria (unlikemore constrained systems such
as fair sharing [3]). Studying the existence of Nash equilibria under arbitrary cost sharing has been an interesting research
problem and researchers have proven existence for many important games [2,4,11,16,17]. Interestingly, in many of these
problems it has been shown that the equilibrium is indeed cheap, i.e., costs as much as the socially optimal network. As we
show in this paper, this tells us that in the network design contexts we consider, arbitrary sharing produces more efficient
outcomes while giving the players more freedom.
Related work. Over the last few years, there have been several new papers using arbitrary cost-sharing, e.g., [2,11,16,18].
Recently, Hoefer [17] proved some interesting results for a generalization of the game in [4], and considered arbitrary sharing
in variants of Facility Location.
3 The solution that maximizes the social welfare is the one that minimizes the total cost of all the players.
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Unquestionably one of the most important decisions when modeling network design involving strategic agents is to
determine how the total cost of the solution is going to be split among the players. Among various alternatives [9], the
‘‘fair sharing" mechanism is the most relevant to ours [3,7,8,12]. In this cost sharing mechanism, the cost of each edge of
the network is shared equally by the players using that edge. This model has received much attention, mostly because
of the following three reasons. Firstly, it nicely quantifies what people mean by ‘‘fair’’ and has an excellent economic
motivation since it is strongly related to the concept of the Shapley value [3]. Secondly, fair sharing naturally models the
congestion effects of network routing games, and so network design games with fair sharing fall into the well-studied class
of ‘‘congestion games" [7,10,19,22]. Thirdly, this model has many attractive mathematical properties including guarantees
on the existence of Nash equilibrium that can be obtained by natural game playing [3].
Despite all of the advantages of congestion games mentioned above, there are extremely important disadvantages as
well. Firstly, although congestion games are guaranteed to have Nash equilibria, these equilibria may be very expensive.
Anshelevich et al. [3] showed that the cheapest Nash equilibrium solution can beΩ(log n) times more expensive than OPT
in network games with fair sharing, and that this bound is tight. As we prove in this paper, arbitrary cost-sharing will often
guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria that are as cheap as the socially optimal solution. Secondly, fair sharing inherently
assumes the existence of a central authority that regulates the agent interactions or determines the cost shares of the agents,
which may not be realistic in many network design scenarios. Arbitrary cost sharing allows the agents to pick their own
cost shares, without any requirements by the central authority. Thirdly, although the players are trying to minimize their
payments in fair cost sharing, they are not permitted to adjust their payments freely, i.e., a player cannot directly specify her
payments on each edge, but is rather asked to specify which edges she wants to use. In the network design contexts that we
consider here, we prove that giving players more freedom can often result in better outcomes.
The research on non-cooperative network design and formation games is too much to survey here, see [20–22] and the
references therein. See [1] for the preliminary conference version of this manuscript.
Our results. Our main results are about the existence and computation of cheap approximate equilibria. By an α-
approximate Nash equilibrium, we mean that no player in such a solution has a deviation that will improve her cost by
a factor of more than α. While our techniques are inspired by [4], our problem and connectivity requirements are much
more general, and so require the development of much more general arguments and payment schemes.
– In Section 3, we show that in the case where all nodes are player nodes, there exists a Nash equilibrium as good as OPT,
i.e., the price of stability is 1.
– In Section 4, we show that in the general case where some nodes may not be player nodes, there exists a 2-approximate
Nash equilibrium as good as OPT.
– We show that if every player is replaced by two players (or if every player node has at least two players associated with
it), then the price of stability is 1. This is in the spirit of similar results from selfish routing [3,22], where increasing the
total amount of players reduces the price of anarchy.
– Starting with a β-approximation to OPT, we provide poly-time algorithms for computing an (1 + ϵ)-approximate
equilibrium with cost no more than β times OPT, for the case where all nodes are player nodes. The same holds for
the general case with the factor being (2.78+ ϵ) instead.
Since for monotone happiness functions F , OPT corresponds to a constrained forest problem [14], then the last result
gives us a poly-time algorithm with β = 2. Notice that we assumed that the function F is monotone, i.e., addition of more
terminals to a component does not hurt. This assumption is necessary, since as we prove in Section 6, if F is not monotone
there may not exist any approximate Nash equilibria. We also show that the results above are only possible in our model
with arbitrary cost-sharing, and not with fair sharing.
Because of its applications to multi-homing [5,23], we are especially interested in the behavior of Terminal Backup
connectivity requirements, i.e., when a player node desires to connect to at least k other player nodes. For this special case,
we prove a variety of results, such as price of anarchy bounds and the improvement of fair sharing results from [3] for this
new problem. The lower bounds for Terminal Backup also hold for the general Group Network Formation Game, showing that
while the price of stability may be low, the price of anarchy can be as high as the number of players.
2. Properties of the socially optimal network
In this section, we will show some useful properties of the socially optimal network for the Group Network Formation
Game, which we refer to as OPT. For notational convenience, we will extend the definition of the happiness function to
subgraphs and use F(S) to denote the value of the happiness function for the set of terminal nodes in a connected component
S.
The cost of a network for player i in which her connectivity requirement is not satisfied is ∞. Therefore, OPT is the
minimum cost network that satisfies the connectivity requirements of all the players. Furthermore, since the satisfaction of
the players only depends on the terminal nodes they are connected to, then OPT is acyclic, since otherwise one can obtain
a cheaper network that satisfies all the players simply by deleting any one of the edges of a cycle included in OPT.
Observation 1. The socially optimal network for the Group Network Formation Game is the minimum cost forest that satisfies all
the players.
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Let e = (i, j) be an arbitrary edge of a tree T of OPT. Removal of e will divide T into 2 subtrees, namely Ti and Tj (let Ti
be the tree containing node i). After removal of e, connectivity requirements of some of the players in T will be dissatisfied,
i.e., either F(Ti) = 0 or F(Tj) = 0, since otherwise OPT − e would be a network that is cheaper than OPT and satisfies all
the players. Therefore, once e is deleted from OPT, all the players in Ti or Tj or both will be dissatisfied. The players that are
dissatisfied upon removal of e are said to witness e. If e is witnessed by only the players in Ti or only the players in Tj then e
is said to be an edgewitnessed from 1-side. Analogously, we say e iswitnessed from 2-sides if it is witnessed by all the players
in T .
In general, some of the edges of a tree T may be witnessed from 1-side whereas some others are witnessed from 2-sides.
We show that the edges of T witnessed from 2-sides form a connected component in T .
Proposition 1. Let e = (i, j) be an edge of T that is witnessed from 1-side, w.l.o.g. from the side of i. Then all the edges in Ti are
also witnessed from 1-side.
Proof. Let f = (u, v) be an arbitrary edge in Ti and let v be the node closer to i in Ti. If f is removed from T then T would be
divided into 2 trees, namely Tu and Tv where Tu ⊂ Ti and Tv ⊃ Tj. Since e is witnessed only by the players in Ti, F(Ti) = 0
and F(Tj) = 1. Since F is a monotone function, F(Tu) = 0 and F(Tv) = 1 and therefore, f is witnessed from 1-side, from the
side of u. 
Corollary 1. The edges of T witnessed from 2-sides form a connected component in T .
Proof. If there is no or exactly one edge in T that is witnessed from 2-sides then the result trivially holds. Assume there
exists an edge f that is witnessed from 2-sides. Let r be a node of T that is incident to f , and root T at r . Let e be an arbitrary
edge in T that is witnessed from 2-sides. Observe that all the edges between e and the root r are witnessed from 2-sides,
since if an edge of this path were witnessed from 1-side, then by Proposition 1 so would e. Therefore, the set of edges of T
that are witnessed from 2-sides form a connected component in T that contains r . 
3. When all nodes are terminals
For the Group Network Formation Game, we do not know whether there exists an exact Nash equilibrium for all possible
instances of the problem. However, for the special case where each node of G is a terminal node, we prove that Nash
equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. Specifically, there exists a Nash equilibrium whose cost is as much as OPT, and therefore
price of stability is 1. In this section, we will prove this result, which is stated as Theorem 1, by explicitly forming the stable
payments on the edges of OPT by giving a payment algorithm. The payment algorithm,whichwill be formally defined below,
first roots the tree and then loops through all the players/nodes in reverse BFS order and decides their payments for all their
incident edges. The algorithm never asks a player i to pay for the cost of an edge e that is not incident to i.
Theorem 1. The Group Network Formation Game is guaranteed to have a Nash equilibrium as cheap as the socially optimal
solution, i.e., the price of stability is 1, if every node of G is a player node.
Since we are trying to form a Nash equilibrium, no player i should have an incentive of unilateral deviation from her
strategy pi when the algorithm terminates, i.e., |pi| should not bemore than the cost of the best deviation of player i. Observe
that a best deviation of player i, which we denote by χi (p−i), is the cheapest strategy of player i that satisfies her connection
requirement given the strategies p−i of other players.While such a deviationmay not be unique, for our purposes it is enough
to let χi (p−i) denote an arbitrary best response of player i to strategy p−i. We will show that pi + p−i buys all the edges of
OPT when our payment algorithm terminates, and that those payments form a Nash equilibrium.
Notation and invariant. Let p∗ denote the cheapest strategy vector that buys all the edges of OPT, i.e., p∗(e) = c(e) if e is
in OPT and p∗(e) = 0 otherwise. Let pi denote the minimum payment to be made by other players to buy all the edges of
OPT given that player i plays the strategy pi, i.e., pi = p∗ − pi. To have an easier analysis we want our algorithm to have a
stronger property: we not only want it to ensure stability at termination but also at each intermediate step. In other words,
at any step of the algorithm, the inequality |pi| ≤ |χi (pi) |will hold, i.e., the payment strategy pi assigned to i should be the
cheapest strategy of i that satisfies her connectivity requirement, assuming the rest of the payments to buy all the edges of
OPT aremade by other players. Note that if all the edges of OPT are bought, i.e., pi+p−i = p∗, then p−i = pi and the invariant
|pi| ≤ |χi (pi) | turns into the Nash equilibrium condition. To show that our algorithm produces a Nash equilibrium as cheap
as OPT, it is thus enough to prove the following two statements:
– The invariant |pi| ≤ |χi (pi) | holds at every step of our algorithm for all players i.
– When the algorithm terminates, all the edges of OPT are bought by the players.
Computing deviations. Here we discuss how deviations can be computed. This will be important in Section 5 when we talk
about our polynomial-time results, but in this section we are only concerned with existence results and so include this
discussion only in order to improve intuition about the nature of deviations. When computing χi(pi), note that all edges
of OPT such that i is not contributing any payment to them can be used by i freely to satisfy her connectivity requirement.
Therefore, when computing the cheapest deviation for a player i, we should not use the actual cost of the edges in G, but
5302 E. Anshelevich, B. Caskurlu / Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 5298–5314
Input: The socially optimal network OPT
Output: The payment scheme for OPT that is a Nash equilibrium
Initialize pi(e) = 0 for all players i and edges e;
Root each tree T of OPT by an arbitrary node incident to an edge witnessed from
2-sides;
Loop through all trees T of OPT;
Loop through all nodes i of T in reverse BFS order;
Let Ti be the subtree of T below i;
Loop through all edges e of Ti incident to i;
Let d(e) = c(e)−∑j≠i pj(e);
If |χi (pi, e) | − |pi| ≥ d(e)
Set pi(e) = d(e);
Else break;
Let g to be the parent edge of node i;
Set pi(g) = min{|χi (pi, e) | − |pi|, c(g)};
Algorithm 1: Algorithm that generates payments on the edges of OPT.
instead for each edge f , we should use the cost iwould face if she is to use f , which will be referred to asmodified cost of f for
i, and denoted by c ′i (f ) in the rest of the paper. Specifically, for f not in OPT, c
′
i (f ) = c(f ), the actual cost of f . For the edges f
of OPT that i has not contributed anything to (i.e., pi(f ) = 0), we have that c ′i (f ) = 0, since from i’s perspective, she can use
these edges for free because other players have paid for them. For all the other edges f that i is paying pi(f ) for, c ′i (f ) = pi(f ),
since that is howmuch it costs for i to use f in her deviation from the payment strategy pi. Using these modified costs, χi(pi)
is simply the cheapest set of edges which fulfill player i’s connectivity requirements.
Wenowpresent an algorithmwhich satisfies the twopropertiesmentioned above (the pseudocode is shown inAlgorithm
1). At the beginning of the algorithm |pi| = 0 for all players i, and therefore the invariant is trivially satisfied by all the
players. At every step, the algorithm asks a player i tomake a payment for an incident edge e of i. Let d(e) denote the amount
of payment i should make in order to buy e, i.e., d(e) = c(e) −∑j≠i pj(e). Recall that the algorithm should never assign a
payment for a player that violates the invariant |pi| ≤ |χi (pi) |. Let x denote the maximum amount of payment player i can
make for e in order not to violate the invariant. If x ≥ d(e) then the algorithm should ask i to pay d(e) for e and ask it to pay
x for e otherwise, and therefore the invariant is never violated throughout the algorithm.
What is this value x, however, and how to we compute it? For a strategy pi of player i, let χi (pi, e) denote the cheapest
deviation of player i from the strategy pi that does not use the edge e, assuming that the rest of the players are paying for pi.
Observe that |χi (pi, e) | ≥ |χi (pi) |. Then we argue below that x ≥ min{|χi (pi, e) | − |pi|, d(e)}. To see this, we consider the
strategy pi + x where player i pays x for edge e. We are abusing notation here, since x is a number, not a payment vector.
Formally, by pi+ xwewill mean the payment strategy which equals pi everywhere except at e, with (pi+ x)(e) = pi(e)+ x.
Lemma 1. Given payments pi which do not violate the invariant, player i can increase her payments on edge e by min{|χi
(pi, e) | − |pi|, d(e)} and not violate the invariant.
Proof. To see this, suppose that x is the maximum amount that i can pay for edge e without violating the invariant, and
x < d(e). Now suppose to the contrary that x < |χi (pi, e) | − |pi|. This means that |pi + x| = |pi| + x < |χi (pi, e) |. By
Lemma 2, we know that |χi (pi, e) | = |χi

pi + x
 |. Therefore, |pi+ x| < |χi pi + x |, and so we can increase x and still not
violate the invariant. This gives us a contradiction with x being maximum. 
Lemma 2. Let pi denote the strategy of player i right before she is asked tomake a payment for e and let x < d(e) be themaximum
amount of payment i can make for e without violating the invariant. Then, |χi (pi, e) | = |χi

pi + x
 |, i.e., at least one of the best
deviations of player i right after she makes a payment of x for e does not use e.
Proof. For the purpose of contradiction, assume that all of the cheapest deviations of player i after she pays x for e, i.e.,
χi

pi + x

, uses e. Let µ = χi pi + x, e > χi pi + x be the cost of the cheapest deviation of player i that does not use
e right after i pays x for e. Observe that if the payment of i for e is increased by y = min{µ − |χi

pi + x
 |, d(e) − x}, the
cost of all deviations of player i that use edge e increases by the same amount. The invariant is still not violated after this
increase, which contradicts the assumption that x is the maximum amount of payment she canmake for ewithout violating
the invariant. 
Because of Lemma 1, it is clear that Algorithm 1 maintains the invariant at every step, since we never ask a player to pay
for more than min{|χi (pi, e) | − |pi|, d(e)} for an edge e. We must now show that Algorithm 1 purchases all the edges of
OPT. Recall that the algorithm asks the players to pay for their incident edges only. Therefore, each edge is considered for
payment twice. For each edge e = (i, j)where j is the parent of i, first i is asked to make her maximum amount of payment
for e that will not violate the invariant. At the later iterations of the algorithm, when j is processed, the algorithm asks j to
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pay for the remaining cost of e. Therefore, if the payment algorithm successfully pays for the cost of all the edges of OPT, i.e.,
it does not execute the ‘break’ command, then it finds a Nash equilibriumwhose cost is as much as OPT. To prove our result
all we need to do is to prove that the algorithm never executes the ‘break’ command at any intermediate step.Wewill prove
this by constructing a network cheaper than OPT which satisfies all the players’ connectivity requirements whenever the
algorithm executes ‘break’, thus forming a contradiction.
Specifically, wewill consider networks formed by players’ deviations. Recall that by Lemma 2, when a player i cannot pay
d(e) but some amount x < d(e) for an incident edge e without violating the invariant, she does have a deviation that costs
as much as her strategy pi + x and does not use e. Define Xi(pi, e) to be the graph formed by removing the edges paid for
by pi + x from OPT, and then adding the edges paid for in χi (pi, e). In other words, Xi(pi, e) is the network of bought edges
formed if player i deviates from her current strategy pi + x to χi (pi, e), with the payments of the other players being pi + x.
The edges added to OPT by this deviation cost at most |pi+ x|, and the edges removed cost strictly greater than |pi+ x|. The
cost is strictly greater because e is one of the edges removed, and player i does not fully pay for edge e in the payment pi+ x.
Therefore, we know that the graph Xi(pi, e) is strictly cheaper than OPT.
Since the algorithm roots T by a node incident to an edge witnessed from 2-sides and the edges of T that are witnessed
from 2-sides form a connected component in T by Corollary 1, every edge e = (i, j) of T that is witnessed from 1-side is
witnessed from the side of the lower level adjacent node. Without loss of generality, assume i is the lower level adjacent
node of e, i.e., e ∉ Ti and e ∈ Tj. The algorithm cannot execute the ‘break’ command while a player is asked to pay for the
cost of an edge e witnessed from 1-side since, as Lemma 3 proves, i will pay for the whole cost of e when she is asked to
make a payment for e. In order to show that the algorithm does not execute the ‘break’ command when a player is asked to
pay for an edge that is witnessed from 2-sides, we need the nice properties of graphs Xi(pi, e) given by Lemmas 4 and 5.
Lemma 3. Let e = (i, j) be an edge of T that is witnessed from 1-side, and let i be the lower level incident node. Then when the
algorithm asks player i to make payment for e, she will pay for the entire cost of e.
Proof. We will prove the lemma by induction on the number of edges in the subtree Ti. First consider the case where i is
a leaf-node of T , i.e., the number of edges in Ti is 0, as the base case of induction. If the player in i does not pay an amount
c(e) for the edge e then she has a deviation χi (pi, e) whose cost is less than c(e). Then we will ask player i to play χi (pi, e)
as her strategy. The graph Xi(pi, e) obtained by deleting e from OPT and adding the edges bought by the strategy χi (pi, e)
is clearly cheaper than OPT since the total cost of the edges bought by χi (pi, e) is less than c(e). Since none of the players
except player i was witnessing e in OPT, the connectivity requirements of all other players will be satisfied in Xi(pi, e). The
connectivity requirement of player i is trivially satisfied since she is the only deviating player. Since Xi(pi, e) satisfies all the
players and is cheaper than OPT, the player in iwill pay c(e) for e (otherwise we have a contradiction).
Now consider an arbitrary edge e = (i, j) that is witnessed from 1-side. Note that all the edges in Ti are witnessed from
1-side by Proposition 1 and therefore are bought by their lower level adjacent players by the inductive assumption. So player
i is not asked to pay for any edge but e by the algorithm. Assume player i does not pay an amount c(e) for the edge e when
she is asked to make payment for e. Then she has a deviation χi (pi, e)whose cost is less than c(e). Then we will ask player
i to play χi (pi, e) as her strategy. Similar to the above case, Xi(pi, e) is clearly cheaper than OPT since the total cost of the
edges bought by χi (pi, e) is less than c(e). Since none of the players except the ones in Ti were witnessing e in OPT and e is
the only edge of OPT that is not part of Xi(pi, e), then the connectivity requirements of all the players except the ones in Ti
are satisfied in Xi(pi, e). However, since all the edges of Ti are part of Xi(pi, e), all the players of Ti are in the same connected
component of Xi(pi, e). Since Xi(pi, e) satisfies the connectivity requirement of player i(the happiness function F evaluates
to 1 for the connected component of i in Xi(pi, e)), it also satisfies the connectivity requirements of all the players in Ti as
well. Since Xi(pi, e) satisfies the connectivity requirements of all the players and cheaper than OPT, we have a contradiction.
Therefore, player i pays the whole cost c(e) of ewhen the algorithm asks her to make a payment for e. 
Lemma 4. Let C be the connected component containing i in Xi(pi, e). Then, C contains either all players of T or another tree T ′
of OPT.
Proof. By Lemma 3, all the subtrees Tu of i that are linked to i by a 1-sided edge (u, i) will be in C , since the edge (u, i) will
be entirely paid for by u. Let Tv be a subtree linked to i by a 2-sided edge (v, i), and suppose to the contrary that Tv is not in
C . Since (v, i) is a 2-sided edge, then T − Tv is not a happy component, and so in order for the connectivity requirement of i
to be satisfied, she must be connected to some tree T ′ of OPT, as desired. 
Let i be a player that paid x < c(e) for her upper level incident edge e = (i, j) when the algorithm asked her to make a
payment for e. Then, by Lemma 4, the connected component C of Xi(pi, e) that contains i, either contains all the players of T
or another tree T ′ of OPT. If C contains all the players of T then Xi(pi, e) would be a graph cheaper than OPT and satisfying
the connectivity requirements of all the players, which would be a contradiction. Assume C does not contain all the players
of T but another tree T ′ of OPT. Let S be a subset of the players in Ti such that for every u ∈ S, u paid strictly less than c(f ) for
her upper level incident edge f when the algorithm asked her to pay for f . The following lemma states that we can obtain
a graph G′ cheaper than OPT that satisfies the connectivity requirements of all the players in Ti, by replacing the strategies
pu of some elements u of S with their respective deviations χu (pu, f ), none of which use any of the edges of T − Ti. In other
words, if a player i cannot pay the whole cost of her upper level incident edge then there is a way to satisfy the connectivity
requirements of all the players in Ti without increasing their cost and without relying on the payments of the players in
T − Ti.
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Lemma 5. Let i be a player that could not pay the whole cost of her upper level incident edge e and the connected component
of Xi(pi, e) that contains i does not contain all the players of T . Then, one can obtain a graph G′ cheaper than OPT that satisfies
the connectivity requirements of all the players in Ti, by replacing the strategies pu of some elements u of S with their respective
deviations χu (pu, f ), none of which use any of the edges of T − Tu.
Proof. We will prove the lemma by induction on the number of nodes in Ti. Consider the case where i is a leaf node as the
base case. If player i cannot pay c(e) but some amount x < c(e) when the algorithm asks her to pay for her upper level
incident edge e, then she has a deviation χi(pi, e) such that |χi(pi, e)| = x < c(e). Observe that the set of edges bought in
Xi(pi, e) cannot be connecting i to T − Ti since e is the cheapest path between i and T − Ti. Therefore, iwill be connected to
a different tree of OPT without connecting to T − Ti if she plays χi(pi, e) as her strategy. Since i is the only deviating player,
her connectivity requirements are trivially satisfied in Xi(pi, e) and since there is no other player in Ti, the lemma holds.
Consider the casewhere i is not a leaf-node. If player i cannot pay c(e) but some amount x < c(e)when the algorithmasks
her to pay for her upper level incident edge e, then she has a deviation χi(pi, e) such that |χi(pi, e)| = |pi + x| < |pi| + c(e)
where pi is the strategy of player i right before she pays for e and therefore, Xi(pi, e) is strictly cheaper than OPT. By Lemma 4,
the connected component C of Xi(pi, e) that contains i, either contains all terminals of T or a different tree T ′ of OPT. As
pointed out above, C cannot contain all the terminals in T since otherwise Xi(pi, e) would be a graph cheaper than OPT
that satisfies the connectivity requirements of all the players. Therefore, C contains a different tree T ′ of OPT. Observe that
i is not connected to the terminals of T − Ti in Xi(pi, e) since the shortest path between i and T − Ti is e and therefore,
χi(pi, e)would not be a best deviation of player i otherwise. The set of players in the subtrees of Ti that are connected to i in
Xi(pi, e) (included in C) are connected to T ′ as well, and so their connectivity requirements are also satisfied in Xi(pi, e). Let
i1, i2, . . . , ik be the children of i in T such that they are not connected to i in Xi(pi, e), i.e., C does not contain them. By the
inductive hypothesis, for every subtree Tij , there is a set of players Sj in Tij such that by replacing the strategies of the players
in Sj with their respective best deviations, none of which uses any of the edges of T −Tij , we can obtain a graph cheaper than
OPT where the connectivity requirements of all the players in Tij are satisfied.
Consider the graph G′ that results by replacing the strategies of the players in ∪jSj ∪ {i} with their respective best
deviations. Notice that all the players in each subtree Tij are connected to a tree of OPT other than T in G
′, since the best
deviations of none of the players in Sj uses any edges of T − Tij , and so the fact that other players (∪l≠jSl ∪ {i}) deviate and
possibly remove their payments from some edges of T − Tij does not affect them. The players connected to i in Xi(pi, e) are
still connected to a tree T ′, since all the edges of the connected component C of Xi(pi, e) are also in G′. Therefore, all the
players of Ti are connected to trees of OPT other than T . Since the happiness function F is monotone, this means that all the
connectivity requirements of all players in Ti are satisfied. 
We are now ready to prove that Algorithm 1 never executes the ‘break’ command, and thus pays for all the edges of OPT.
For the purpose of contradiction, assume Algorithm 1 executed the ‘break’ command right after a player i is asked to pay for
an incident edge e = (v, i). Since the algorithm only executes the ‘break’ command if the sum of payments of the adjacent
players v and i does not cover the total cost of the edge and the higher level incident player is always asked later than the
lower level incident player, e is the lower level incident edge of player i. Observe that e is witnessed from 2-sides since
otherwise v would have already paid for the total cost of e by Lemma 3. Recall that since i cannot pay for the remaining cost
d(e) of e but some amount x < d(e)when she is asked to pay for ewithout violating the invariant, she does have a deviation
χi(pi, e) such that |χi(pi, e)| = |pi|+xwhere pi is the strategy of player i right before she pays for e. Recall that the connected
component C of Xi(pi, e) that contains i, either contains all terminals of T or a different tree T ′ of OPT by Lemma 4. However,
C cannot contain all terminals of T since otherwise Xi(pi, e), which is cheaper than OPT, would be a network satisfying the
connectivity requirements of all the players. Therefore, C contains a different tree T ′ of OPT, as well as T − Ti (since i has
not paid for any of the edges of T − Ti) and possibly some but not all subtrees of Ti. So, Xi(pi, e) satisfies the connectivity
requirements of all the terminals except the ones that are in the subtrees of Ti which are not in C .
Let Ti1 , Ti2 , . . . , Tik be the subtrees of Ti that are not contained in C and let f1, f2, . . . , fk be the upper level incident edges
of the roots of these subtrees in OPT. Observe that none of the players at the roots of Ti1 , Ti2 , . . . , Tik have paid for the entire
cost of their respective upper level incident edges f1, f2, . . . , fk when the algorithm asked, since otherwise player i would
contribute nothing to these edges, and so the subtrees Ti1 , Ti2 , . . . , Tik would be in C . To complete the proof all we need to
prove is that we canmodify Xi(pi, e)without increasing its cost such that we connect the players in Ti1 , Ti2 , . . . , Tik to happy
connected components. This is exactly what Lemma 5 proves.
4. Good equilibria in the general game
In Section 3, we saw that a good equilibrium always exists when all nodes are terminals. In this section, we consider the
general Group Network Formation Game, and show that there always exists a 2-approximate Nash equilibrium that is as
cheap as the centralized optimum. By a 2-approximate Nash equilibrium, we mean a strategy profile p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn)
such that no player i can reduce her cost by more than a factor of 2 by unilaterally deviating from pi to χi(p−i), i.e.,
|χi(p−i)| ≥ |pi|/2 for all players i. To prove this, we first look at an important special case that we call the Group Network
Formation of Couples Game or GNFCG. This game is exactly the same as the Group Network Formation Game, except that
every player node has at least two players located at that node (although not all nodes need to be player nodes).
E. Anshelevich, B. Caskurlu / Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 5298–5314 5305
Theorem 2. If the price of stability for the GNFCG is 1 then there exists a 2-approximate Nash Equilibrium for the Group Network
Formation Game that costs as much as OPT.
Proof. Assume we are given an instance ℑ1 = (N1,G, T , F) of a Group Network Formation Game, i.e., we are given a set of
players N1 = {1, 2, . . . , n}, a graph G = (V , E) such that each edge e ∈ E is associated with a nonnegative cost c(e), a set of
terminal nodes T ⊆ V such that each player i ∈ N1 is located at a terminal node u ∈ T and a monotone happiness function
F : 2T → {0, 1}. All we need to show is that ℑ1 has a 2-approximate Nash equilibrium as cheap as OPT assuming price of
stability for the Group Network Formation of Couples Game is 1.
We will first define an instance ℑ2 = (N2,G, T , F) of the Group Network Formation of Couples Game. Observe that the
graph G, the set of terminal nodes T and the monotone happiness function F for both ℑ1 and ℑ2 are the same; however, the
number of players of ℑ2 is twice as much as the number of players of ℑ1, i.e., N2 = {1, 2, . . . , 2n}. For each player i ∈ N1 of
ℑ1 located at u ∈ T there are 2 corresponding players i, (n+ i) ∈ N2 of ℑ2 located at u.
First observe that the socially optimal network for both games ℑ1 and ℑ2 is the same since any network satisfying the
players ofℑ1 also satisfies the players ofℑ2 and vice versa. Let OPT denote the socially optimal network of both of the games.
As in Section 3, let p∗ denote the strategy vector that buys all the edges of OPT, i.e., p∗(e) = c(e) if e is in OPT and p∗(e) = 0
otherwise.
Since we have assumed that the price of stability for Group Network Formation of Couples Game is 1, we know that there
exists a stable strategy profile p = (p1, p2, . . . , p2n) for the players N2 of ℑ2 that buys OPT. That is, for each player i ∈ N2,
|χi(p∗ − pi)| = |pi|. Furthermore, since player i and player (n+ i) sit at the same terminal node for i ≤ n, the stable strategy
pi of player i is also a stable strategy for player (n+ i), i.e., if all the players except player (n+ i) pays p∗ − pi then the best
response of player (n+ i) is pi.
To complete the proof, all we need to do is to give a strategy profile p′ = (p′1, p′2, . . ., p′n) for the players of ℑ1 such that∑
i p
′
i = p∗ and for each i ∈ N1, |p′i| ≤ 2
χi(p∗ − p′i). We define p′ as follows. For each player i ∈ N1, p′i = pi + p(n+i). Since
pi and p(n+i) are stable strategies for players i and (n+ i) of ℑ2 respectively, we have that |pi| = |χi (p∗ − pi)| and |p(n+i)| =χi p∗ − p(n+i). Since |χi (p∗ − pi)| , χi p∗ − p(n+i) ≤ χi p∗ − p′i, we have p′i = |pi|+|p(n+i)| ≤ 2 χi p∗ − p′i. 
Because of Theorem 2, wewill focus on the GNFCG in the rest of the section and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium
as cheap as OPT. This result is interesting in its own right, since it states that to form an equilibrium that is as good as
the optimum solution, it is enough to double the number of players. Such results are already known for many variants of
congestion games and selfish routing [3,22], but as Theorem3 shows,we can also prove such results for gameswith arbitrary
sharing.
We use the same notation as in Section 3, including the definitions of p∗, pi, and χi. Given a set of bought edges T , a
strategy profile p is a Nash equilibrium when |χi(p−i)| = |pi| for all players i. To prove that price of stability is 1 for GNFCG,
we give an algorithm that forms such a strategy profile on the edges of OPT. Recall that the payment strategies of all the
players have to be stable when the algorithm terminates. As in Section 3, to have an easier analysis we not only want our
algorithm to ensure stability at termination but also at each intermediate step. Specifically, we give an algorithm such that:
– The invariant |pi| ≤ |χi (pi) | holds at every step of our algorithm for all players i.
– When the algorithm terminates, all the edges of OPT are bought by the players.
The second property guarantees that the invariant is exactly the Nash equilibrium condition, since when all the edges of
OPT are bought, then p−i = pi. Therefore, the above two conditions imply that the price of stability is 1. In the rest of the
section we prove our main theorem for the GNFCG.
Theorem 3. For GNFCG, there exists a Nash equilibrium as cheap as the socially optimal network, i.e., the price of stability is 1.
For ease of explanation, we will first consider the case where all the edges of OPT are witnessed from two sides and later
illustrate how our algorithm can be modified for the case where some of the edges are witnessed from one side only. We
start by rooting each connected component of OPT arbitrarily by a high degree non-player node. Throughout the paper, the
term high degree node refers to the nodes with degree 3 or more. On each connected component T of OPT, we run a 2-phase
algorithm. In the first phase of the algorithm, we assign players to make payments to the edges of T in a bottom-upmanner,
i.e., we start from a lowest level edge e of T and pick a player i to make some payment for e and continue with the next edge
in the reverse BFS order. In the first phase of the algorithm, we ask a player i to contribute only for the cost of edges on the
unique path between her and the root and furthermore, the payment for each edge is made by only one player.
Algorithm (Phase 1). For an arbitrary edge e = (u, v) where u is the lower level incident node of e, the assignment of the
player to pay for e is as follows. If u is a terminal node, we ask a player i located at node u to make maximum amount of
payment on e that will not make pi violate the invariant, i.e., we set pi(e) = min{χi(pi, e)− |pi|, c(e)}. This will not violate
the invariant by the same reasoning as in Section 3 (i.e., Lemma 1 still holds). If u is a degree 2 nonterminal node then we
ask the player who has completely bought the other incident edge of u, i.e., made a payment equal to the cost of that edge,
to makemaximum amount of payment on e that will not make her strategy unstable (i.e., violate the invariant) as shown on
the left of Fig. 1(A). Note that it may be the case that no player has bought the other incident edge of u in which case we do
not ask any player to pay for e and the payment for e will be postponed to the second phase of the algorithm. If u is a high
degree nonterminal then the selection of the player to pay for e is based on the number of lower level incident edges of u
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Fig. 1. (A) Illustrates the assignment of the player to pay for the cost of e. (B) Shows how to construct a cheap network that satisfies all the players in Te by
using the deviations of a subset S of them.
that are bought in the previous iterations of the algorithm. If none of the lower level incident edges of u are bought then we
postpone the payment on e to the second phase of the algorithm. If exactly one of the lower level incident edges of u, namely
f , is bought thenwe ask the player who bought f tomakemaximum amount of payment on e that will notmake her strategy
unstable (i.e., violate the invariant) as shown in the middle of Fig. 1(A). If 2 or more of the lower level incident edges of u are
already bought, namely f1, f2, . . . , fl, then we fix the strategies of the players i1, i2, . . . , il that bought those edges, i.e., the
players i1, i2, . . . , il are not going to pay any more and therefore the strategies of those players that will be returned at the
end of the algorithm are already determined. Since there are two players located at every terminal, pick an arbitrary player
located at the same terminal as one of i1, i2, . . . , il that has not made any payments yet, and assign her to make maximum
amount of payment for e that will notmake her strategy unstable as shown on the right of Fig. 1(A).We later prove that such
a player always exists, i.e., not all of i1, i2, . . . , il are the last players to make payment at their respective terminal nodes.
Notation. Wenowdefine some helpful notation in order to prove some lemmas about the first phase of the algorithmwhich
is fully specified above. Whenwe are talking about a player i, let T denote the connected component of OPT containing i and
let T ′ denote the set of other connected components ofOPT. The strategy of a player is denotedby piwhich is a vector of length
m, the total number of edges inG, where each entry of pi indicates the payment player i ismaking for the corresponding edge.
Recall that we use p∗ for the strategy vector that buys OPT, i.e., p∗(e) = c(e) if e is an edge of OPT and p∗(e) = 0 otherwise.
Observe that when the algorithm terminates it should be that
∑
i pi = p∗. We use the notation G(p) for the subgraph of
bought edges by strategy p, i.e., the subgraph composed of the edges for which p(e) = c(e). For instance, G(p∗) denotes OPT,
G(p∗ − pi) denotes the subgraph composed of edges bought by players other than i and G(p∗ − pi + χi(pi, e)) denotes the
subgraph of bought edges if player i deviates from her strategy pi to her best deviation that does not use e, χi(pi, e). Finally,
for an arbitrary edge e of a rooted tree T , we use Te in order to refer to the subtree of T below e and Te to refer to the rest of
the tree T − Te. The notation for the subtree of T rooted at a node u is analogously Tu.
We now present the analysis of the first phase of the algorithm by giving a series of lemmas that successively proves
the following. For every edge e that could not be bought in the first phase of the algorithm by the assigned player to make
payment for it, we can connect all the terminal nodes in Te to the connected components of T ′ without using any of the edges
of Te by simply setting pi = χi(pi) for a subset S of players in Te. The deviations of the subset S of the players are depicted in
Fig. 1(B). The condition that no edges of Te are used by the deviations is crucial, since that is what allows us to have a set of
players all deviate at once and still be satisfied afterwards. The fact that such a ‘‘re-wiring’’ exists allows us to argue in our
proofs that at least one of the incident edges of the root of T will be bought during the first phase of the algorithm. In all the
lemmas below, the payment pwill refer to the payment at the end of Phase 1 of the algorithm.
Lemma 6. Let u be an arbitrary terminal node and i be the first player to make payments that is located at u. Let e be the first
edge between u and the earliest ancestor of u which is either a terminal or a high degree nonterminal node such that i could not
buy all of e without violating the invariant. Then all the players in Tu will be satisfied in the subgraph G (p∗ − pi + χi(pi, e))− Te.
Proof. Since every edge f between u and e is bought by player i, i.e., p∗(f ) = pi(f ) = c(f ) and player i did not pay for any
other edge in G, then the subgraph G(p∗−pi) consists of the connected components T ′, Tu and Te. Observe that the players in
Tu, including i, are not satisfied in G(p∗−pi) since according to our assumption, any edge of OPT is witnessed from two sides,
and so any subset of Te cannot be a happy component. Since player i is satisfied in G (p∗ − pi + χi(pi, e)) and not satisfied in
G(p∗−pi), then the subgraphG (p∗ − pi + χi(pi, e))−G(p∗−pi)must include a path Pu between Tu and one of the connected
components in T ′ or Te.
For the purpose of contradiction, assume Pu is a path between Tu and Te. Since T − Tu − Te is a path of degree
2 nonterminal nodes between Tu and Te, then all the players of T will be in the same connected component of
G (p∗ − pi + χi(pi, e)) and therefore the subgraph G (p∗ − pi + χi(pi, e)) satisfies all the players. This is because i must be
satisfied in G (p∗ − pi + χi(pi, e)), and so it is in a happy component. Observe that G (p∗ − pi) has the same set of edges as
OPT except e and the edges bought by player i. Since the cost of χi(pi, e) is equal to the cost of pi by Lemma 2 (which still
holds), then G (p∗ − pi + χi(pi, e)) is a subgraph satisfying all the players and cheaper than OPT. More precisely, the cost of
G (p∗ − pi + χi(pi, e)) is less than the cost of OPT by an amount c(e)−pi(e). Since OPT is the cheapest network satisfying all
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Fig. 2. Shows the deviation χi(pi) of a player i that is located at terminal u and could not buy the edge e.
the players, this is a contradiction and therefore there cannot exist a path between Tu and Te in G (p∗ − pi + χi(pi, e)). Since
the players in Tu are in a connected component that is disjoint from all the nodes and the edges of Te inG (p∗ − pi + χi(pi, e)),
then they are all satisfied in G (p∗ − pi + χi(pi, e))− Te as shown in Fig. 2. 
Lemma 7. Let i be a player such that i did not buy e, i.e., pi(e) < c(e), even though the algorithm assigned i to make payment for
e. Then there exists a subset of players S = (s1, . . . , sk) in Te with deviations χ1(p1, f1), . . . , χk(pk, fk), where fl is the edge player
l could not fully buy, from their respective strategies p1, . . . , pk such that all the players in Te will be satisfied in the subgraph
G

p∗ −∑l∈S pl +∑l∈S χl(pl, fl)− Te.
Proof. Wewill prove this result by induction on the number of nodes in Te. If Te has only 1 node u, then the lemma holds by
Lemma 6. Below we will use the notation R(S) to denote G(p∗ −∑l∈S pl +∑l∈S χl(pl, fl)) and R(S, e) to denote R(S)− Te.
Let us assume that the lemma holds for all instances such that the number of nodes in Te is at most k and let us prove
that the lemma also holds when the number of nodes is k + 1. Let Γ be the set composed of connected components of
G
∑
i∈Te pi

that involves at least one terminal node and let C be the connected component involving i. Observe that C is
the highest level connected component, i.e., the one that is adjacent to e.
Let u be the highest level terminal or high degree nonterminal node in C . If u is a terminal node then the result directly
follows from Lemma 6, with S = {i}, since the terminals in Tu are the same as in Te. Therefore, assume u is a high-degree
nonterminal node. Observe that at least one of the lower level incident edges of u is a bought edge since otherwise C would
not be a connected component of G
∑
i∈Te pi

that involves at least one terminal node. Recall that if at least 2 of the lower
level incident edges of u are bought, i is only assigned to make payment for the edges above u, i.e., player i has not made any
payment on the edges below u. Therefore, all we need to do is to exactly repeat the proof of Lemma 6, once again giving us
the desired result with S = {i}. Let us now consider the final case, which is depicted in Fig. 1(B), where u is a high-degree
nonterminal node such that exactly one lower level incident edge of u is bought.
In this case, let C1, C2, . . . , Ck be the elements ofΓ that are one level lower than C and let e1, e2, . . . , ek be the immediate
higher level unpaid edges of C1, C2, . . . , Ck respectively. By the inductive hypothesis, each of these edges ej already has a
desired set of players Sj in Tej .
The connected component containing i in the subgraph G (p∗ − pi + χi(pi, e)) may also contain a player j in Tej . Since
player i did not make any payment for the edges in Tej , then all the edges of Tej are also part of G (p
∗ − pi + χi(pi, e)) and
therefore all the players in Tej are in the same connected component with i in G (p
∗ − pi + χi(pi, e)). Let Λ be the edges of
e1, e2, . . . , ek such that Tej is not in the same connected component of G(p
∗ − pi + χi(pi, e)) as i. Then, we set the set S to be
∪ej∈ΛSj ∪ {i}.
Wemust now prove that all the players in Te are satisfied in the subgraph R(S, e) = G(p∗−∑l∈S pl+∑l∈S χl(pl, fl))−Te.
First, we prove this for the players in Tej for ej ∈ Λ. By the inductive hypothesis, they are all satisfied in the subgraph
R(Sj, ej) = G

p∗ −∑l∈Sj pl +∑l∈Sj χl(pl, fl) − Tej . Let g be an arbitrary edge in a connected component of a player in Tej
in the subgraph R(Sj, ej). This edge cannot be in Te, since Te ⊆ Tej . This edge cannot be paid for by a player outside Tej , since
those players only pay for edges in Tej . Therefore, g must still be present in R(S, e), and so all players in Tej are still satisfied
in R(S, e).
Now consider the players in C and in Tej for ej ∉ Λ. They are satisfied in G(p∗ − pi + χ(pi, e)) since i is satisfied and
they are in the same connected component. Let g be an arbitrary edge in the connected component of G(p∗ − pi + χ(pi, e))
containing player i. These players are satisfied in R(S) = G p∗ −∑l∈S pl +∑l∈S χl(pl, fl) , since g is still present in R(S).
This is because if g were being paid for by a player j, then it would be part of some subtree Tej with ej ∉ Λ, and so j ∉ S,
and those payments on g would remain unchanged. We need to prove that players in C and in Tej for ej ∉ Λ are satisfied
in R(S, e), and so it is enough to show that g ∉ Te. If this were not the case, then Te is in the same connected component
5308 E. Anshelevich, B. Caskurlu / Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 5298–5314
of R(S) as i. Since i is satisfied in R(S), then so are all the players in Te. We already proved that all players in all subtrees Tej
are satisfied in R(S), and so R(S) is a feasible solution (all the players in the graph are satisfied). Notice, however, that the
solution R(S) is cheaper than OPT, by the same argument as in Lemma 6, and so this is not possible.
Therefore, all the players in Te are satisfied in R(S, e), as desired. 
Lemma 8. Let C1, C2, . . . , Ck be the highest level connected components of the subgraph G
∑
i pi

that include at least one
terminal node, and suppose that these do not include the root of T . Let e1, e2, . . . , el be immediately above incident edges of
C1, C2, . . . , Ck respectively. Let Te1,e2,...,el = T − Te1 − Te2 − · · · − Tek . Then for each Cj there exists a corresponding set Sj of
players in Tej such that all players in T are satisfied in G

p∗ −∑kl=1 ∑j∈Sl pj −∑j∈Sl χj(pj, fj) − Te1,e2,...,ek , where fj is the
edge player j could not fully buy.
Proof. Let i be an arbitrary player in T . Without loss of generality assume it is in Tej . There is a set Sj such that player i is
satisfied in G

p∗ −∑j∈Sj pj −∑j∈Sj χj(pj, fj)− Tej due to Lemma 7. To prove the lemma, all we need to show is that every
edge of G

p∗ −∑j∈Sj pj +∑j∈Sj χj(pj, fj)− Tej is also an edge of G p∗ −∑kl=1 ∑j∈Sl pj −∑j∈Sl χj(pj, fj)− Te1,e2,...,ek .
First let us consider the edges of T . Observe that none of the edges in Tej are in G(p
∗ −∑j∈Sj pj +∑j∈Sj χj(pj, e)) − Tej .
Therefore all we need is to check the edges in Tej . Since the algorithm never assigns a player i to pay for the edges that
are not on the unique path between the terminal i and the root of T , none of the players in T − Tej made payment for
any edge in Tej . Since the players in

l≠j Sl did not make payment on the edges of Tej , then an edge of Tej that is in
G

p∗ −∑j∈Sj pj +∑j∈Sj χj(pj, fj)− Tej is also an edge of G p∗ −∑kl=1 ∑j∈Sl pj −∑j∈Sl χj(pj, fj)− Te1,e2,...,ek .
Now let us consider the edges of T , i.e., the edges outside of T . Since the algorithm never asks the players
to pay for the edges outside of T , an edge not in T is in G

p∗ −∑j∈Sj pj +∑j∈Sj χj(pj, fj) − Tej if and only if
it is also in G
∑
j∈Sj χj(pj, fj)

. Therefore, any edge of T that is in G

p∗ −∑j∈Sj pj +∑j∈Sj χj(pj, fj) − Tej is in
G

p∗ −∑lk=1 ∑j∈Sk pj −∑j∈Sk χj(pj, fj)− Te1,e2,...,el as well. 
Lemma 9. At least one of the incident edges of the root of T will be bought at the end of the first phase of the algorithm.
Proof. For the purpose of contradiction assume none of the incident edges of the root of T is bought at the first phase of the
algorithm and let us obtain a contradiction by constructing a subgraph that is cheaper than OPT and satisfies all the players.
According to Lemma 8, the graph
R = G

p∗ −
k−
l=1
−
j∈Sl
pj −
−
j∈Sl
χj(pj, fj)

− Te1,e2,...,ek
satisfies all the players. Therefore, all we need to show is that the cost of R is less than the cost of OPT. Since the cost of
χi(pi, fi) is equal to the cost of pi by Lemma 2, then we know by the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 6 that R is
strictly cheaper than OPT. 
Algorithm (Phase 2). In the second phase of the algorithm, we ask the players that have not made any payments yet to make
stable payments for the remaining edges and buy them. Let Γ be the set composed of connected components of G(p)− T ′
that include at least one terminal node. In other words, Γ consists of connected components of the edges in T purchased
so far by the algorithm (a single terminal node with no adjacent bought edges would also be a component in Γ ). We call
a connected component C1 ∈ Γ immediately below a connected component C ∈ Γ if after contracting the components
in Γ , C is above C1 in the resulting tree and there are no other components of Γ between them. In the second phase of
the algorithm, we form payments on the edges in a top-down manner as we explain next. We start from the connected
component C ∈ Γ that includes the root of T (this must exist by Lemma 9) and assign a player i in C that has not made
any payments yet to buy all the edges between C and the connected components that are immediately below C . The set of
edges i should buy are shown in Fig. 3. We prove that such a player i always exists in Lemma 10. Observe that once i buys all
the edges between C and the connected components C1, C2, . . . , Ck that are immediately below C , all these k+ 1 connected
components form a single connected C that contains the root. We repeat this procedure, i.e., pick a player i in the top-most
connected component C that has not made a payment yet to buy all the edges between C and the connected components
that are immediately below C , until all the players in T are in the same connected component and all of T is paid for.
Proof of Theorem 3. To show that our algorithm forms an equilibrium payment, we need to prove that all of OPT is paid
for when it terminates, and that the invariant is never violated. It is clear that all of OPT is fully paid for, since Phase 2 of the
algorithms pays for every edge of OPT that was not paid for in Phase 1. It is also clear that the invariant is never violated
during the first phase by construction, and so the final payments of players used in Phase 1 are stable. To finish the proof, we
need to show that a strategy pi that buys all the edges between a connected component C and the connected components
C1, C2, . . . , Ck that are immediately below C is a stable strategy for any player in C , which we show in Lemma 11.
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Fig. 3. Illustrates the set of edges to be bought by a player i located at the connected component that contains the root.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3. Recall that for ease of explanation, we only considered the case where all edges
of OPT are witnessed from two sides until now. In Lemma 12, we modify this algorithm to return a Nash equilibrium that
purchases OPT even if some of the edges of OPT are witnessed from one side.
Lemma 10. At any stage of the algorithm, each connected component of Γ has a player i such that pi(e) = 0 for all edges e.
Proof. The statement is trivially true at the start of the algorithm. In the first phase, consider a time when we ask a player
i, which is not the first to pay among the players with the same terminal node of i, to make payment for some edges. This
only occurs when at least 2 of the lower level incident edges of a high-degree nonterminal u are bought. But then 2 or more
connected components of Γ merge. Since each of these connected components had at least one player who has not made
any payment yet, and only one of them is being asked to pay at this moment, then every component of Γ still has at least
one player that has not made any payments.
In the second phase of the algorithm, one player i buys all the edges between a connected component C and the connected
components C1, C2, . . . , Ck that are immediately below C as shown in Fig. 3. Similar to the above case, after the player imakes
her payment, at least 2 connected components of Γ merge. Therefore, the lemma holds at the end of the second phase of
the algorithm. 
Lemma 11. Let C ∈ Γ be a connected component of bought edges containing the root and let C1, C2, . . . , Ck ∈ Γ be the
connected components of bought edges that are immediately below C. Then for any player i in C the strategy pi that buys all the
edges between C and C1, C2, . . . , Ck is stable, i.e., |pi| ≤ |χi(pi)|.
Proof. Let LC denote the set of edges between C and C1, C2, . . . , Ck. Observe that even though all the edges in LC are not
bought, a player jmay havemade a payment pj(e) < c(e) for some edge e ∈ LC in the first phase of the algorithm. Therefore,
the cost of the strategy pi of player i ∈ C that buys all the edges of LC , which we denote by li, may be less than∑e∈LC c(e).
More precisely, li =∑e∈LC c(e)−∑j pj(e).
We claim that a strategy pi of a player i ∈ C that buys all the edges in LC is stable. For the purpose of contradiction,
assume pi is not a stable strategy, i.e., i could not pay the remaining cost of all the edges in LC . Then, player i has a deviation
χi(pi) from pi such that the cost of χi(pi) is strictly less than li, and therefore the subgraph G (p∗ − pi + χi(pi)) is cheaper
than OPT. Since player i did not make any payment for the edges in C , all the players in C are in the same connected
component of G (p∗ − pi + χi(pi)) as i and therefore are satisfied. If the players in C, C1, C2, . . . , Ck are also in the same
connected component with i in G (p∗ − pi + χi(pi)), then G (p∗ − pi + χi(pi)) satisfies all the players and is cheaper than
OPT. Therefore, the players in some of the connected components C1, C2, . . . , Ck are not in the same connected component
with i in G (p∗ − pi + χi(pi)).
Let K be the subset of connected components C1, C2, . . . , Ck the players of which are not in the same connected
component with i in G (p∗ − pi + χi(pi)). Let e1, . . . , ed be the edges that were unpaid for in the first phase of the algorithm
directly above the components in K . Then by Lemma 8, there is a set of players S such that all the players in Te1 , . . . , Ted are
satisfied in the graph G(p∗ −∑l∈S pl +∑l∈S χl(pl, fl)) − Te1,e2,...,ed . We claim that the subgraph R = G(p∗ −∑j∈S∪i pj +∑
j∈S∪i χj(pj, fj)) satisfies all the players in T and is cheaper than OPT. The latter is clear since |χi(pi)| < li = |pi|. All players
in C and in the subtrees below Cj ∉ K are satisfied in R, since they are satisfied in G (p∗ − pi + χi(pi)), and by construction,
the payments pj for j ∈ Te1 , . . . , Ted do not contain edges of Te1,e2,...,ed . All players in components of K are satisfied in R as
well, since the only edges missing from R that were in G(p∗ −∑j∈S pj +∑j∈S χj(pj, fj)) − Te1,e2,...,ed are edges of pi, which
are all edges of Te1,e2,...,ed . Therefore, all the edges are still there that are needed to satisfy the players in K (and the subtrees
below them). Sincewe constructed a subgraph that satisfies all players and is cheaper than OPT, we have a contradiction. 
Lemma 12. Price of stability is 1 for the Group Network Formation of Couples Game even if some of the edges of OPT are witnessed
from one side.
Proof. We will show the result by slightly modifying the first phase of the algorithm. Recall that by Corollary 1, the edges
witnessed from 2-sides form a connected component of T , which we will refer to as D, and so we root the tree T at a node
in D. Observe that there exists a subset S of nodes of D such that all the edges that are witnessed from 1-side are subtrees
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of T rooted at the nodes of S. If OPT has edges witnessed from 1-side, i.e., not all nodes of S are leaf nodes, we ask the
players to buy the edges witnessed from 1-side first. Specifically, for each u ∈ S, we ask the players in the subtree of 1-sided
edges rooted at u to buy all the edges in their subtree, using the algorithm from [4] for the Single Source Connection Game.
However, we ask only one player per terminal node to form payments in this algorithm. The proof that this set of players
can indeed buy all the edges of this subtree using stable payments is exactly the same as the proof of the Single Source
Connection Game payment algorithm so we will not repeat it here. Specifically, we can reduce this problem to the Single
Source Connection Game by contracting Tu and T ′ into a single node, since every player in Tu must connect either to Tu or T ′
in order to be satisfied.
Once we have formed the payment on the edges witnessed from 1-side, we use our payment algorithm. If u is a terminal
node, one of the players at u pays for the higher level incident edge of u in D. Let us now consider the case where u is a
high degree nonterminal node. If the subtree composed of edges that are witnessed from 1-side has more than one terminal
nodes, we contract the subtree and ask a second player j in one of these terminal nodes to pay for the higher level incident
edge of u. The key observation here is that there are at least 2 players in the subtree (one per each terminal node) that did
not make any payment yet, and so Lemma 10 still holds right after player jmakes her payments. If the subtree has only one
terminal node then the payment for the higher level incident edge depends on the number of lower level incident edges of
u that are bought. If only one of the lower level incident edges of u is bought, the one that belongs to the subtree of edges
witnessed from 1-side, then we ask this player that bought all the edges of the subtree to pay for the higher level incident
edge of u. If at least 2 of the lower level incident edges of u are bought then 2 connected components of bought edges merge
at u and therefore we ask a player that has not made payment yet to pay for the higher level incident edge of u. 
5. Computing equilibria in polynomial time
The proof of our 2-approximate Nash equilibrium result suggests an algorithmwhich forms a cheaper networkwhenever
a 2-approximate Nash equilibrium cannot be found. Using techniques similar to [4], this allows us to form efficient
algorithms to compute approximate equilibria:
Theorem 4. Suppose we are given a feasible solution Gα whose cost is within a factor α of OPT. Then for any ϵ > 0, there
is a polynomial time algorithm which returns a 2.78(1 + ϵ)-approximate Nash equilibrium on a feasible graph G′, where
cost

G′
 ≤ cost (Gα). Furthermore, if all the nodes are player nodes, there is a polynomial time algorithmwhich returns a (1+ϵ)-
approximate Nash equilibrium on a feasible graph G′, where cost

G′
 ≤ cost (Gα).
Proof. We will first prove that given an α-approximation to the socially optimal graph Gα for an instance of the Group
Network Formation Game where all nodes are player nodes and any ϵ > 0, there is a polynomial time algorithm which
returns a (1+ ϵ)-approximate Nash equilibrium on a feasible graph G′, where cost G′ ≤ cost (Gα).
To define our algorithm, recall that the proof in Section 3 followed by constructing a network cheaper than the given one
and the proof ended up with a contradiction since the network at hand was optimal. The proof for obtaining a (1 + ϵ)-
approximate Nash equilibrium in polynomial time on a given α-approximate socially optimal network Gα is based on
following this suggested algorithm to obtain a cheaper network whenever a Nash equilibrium cannot be found. However,
the improvements we consider should be substantial enough to ensure the time-bound, while they should be small enough
to ensure the approximation ratio.
To find a (1+ ϵ)-approximate Nash equilibrium, i.e., a solution where no player can reduce its cost bymore than a factor
of (1+ ϵ) by taking any deviation, we start by defining γ = c(Gα)ϵ
α(1+ϵ)m , where m is the total number of edges of the graph G.
We now use our payment algorithms to pay for all but γ of each edge in Gα . Since Gα is not optimal, it is possible that even
with the γ reduction in price, a player may not pay for the cost of an incident one-sided edge or remaining cost of all her
lower level incident edges, i.e., that Algorithm 1 could execute the ‘break’ command. However, the proofs of Lemma 4 and
Lemma 3 indicate how we can rearrange Gα to reduce its cost. If we modify Gα in this manner, it is easy to show that we
have reduced the cost by at least γ .
Observe that each call to our payment algorithm takes polynomial time if we can compute the best deviation of a player
χi(pi, e) in polynomial time. Recall thatχi(pi, e) is the cheapest set of edges (usingmodified costs) that fulfills i’s connectivity
requirements (see the beginning of Section 3 for a discussion of modified costs). By Lemma 4, χi(pi, e) is the cheapest set
of edges (using modified costs) that connects player i either to a different connected component T ′ of Gα or to all other
terminals of T . To find the best deviation of player i, all we need to do is to find the cheapest deviation that connects i to
a different connected component T ′ of Gα and the cheapest deviation of player i than connects i to all other terminals of T
separately, and then take the cheaper one. The former one is essentially computing the shortest path from player i to any of
the different connected components T ′ (usingmodified costs for the edges) and can be done in polynomial time. Computing
the cheapest deviation of player i that connects i to all other terminals of T we do the following. We obtain a new graph by
merging the terminal iwith all other trees T ′ of Gα . Computing the cheapest deviation of player i that connects i to all other
terminals of T corresponds to connecting all connected components of this new graph, since every node of the graph is a
terminal, which can be done in polynomial time since this problem is the minimum spanning tree problem.
Thuswe know that the Algorithm1 can bemade to run in poly-time, and that at every call to this algorithm it either forms
a Nash equilibrium, or returns a solution that is cheaper by at least γ . Since each call which fails to form a Nash equilibrium
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reduces the cost by γ , we can have at most α(1+ϵ)m
ϵ
calls. And since each call to our payment algorithm can be made to run
in polynomial time, we obtained a network G′ with c

G′
 ≤ c (Gα) such that we have a Nash equilibrium on G′ if the cost of
its edges were decreased by γ in time polynomial inm and ϵ−1.
For all payment strategies pi and for each edge e in G′, we now increase pi(e) in proportion to |pi| so that e is now fully
paid for. Now clearly G′ is fully paid for. To show that we obtained a (1+ ϵ)-approximate Nash equilibrium, all we need to
show is that each stable strategy pi became (1+ ϵ)-approximately stable after they are proportionally increased.
Observe that the payment player i makes is increased to c(G
′)|pi|
c(G′)−m′γ , where m
′ denotes the number of edges in G′. To see
that this is (1+ ϵ)-approximate Nash equilibrium, note that pi was a stable payment before it was increased and therefore
χi(pi), deviation of player iwith respect to pi, was as expensive as pi. Therefore, by deviating with respect to pi, player i can
gain at most a factor of
c

G′

c (G′)−m′γ ≤
c

G′

c (G′)− m′c(Gα)ϵ
α(1+ϵ)m
≤ c

G′

c (G′)− c(G′)ϵ
(1+ϵ)
= (1+ ϵ).
We have given a polynomial-time algorithm which returns a (1+ ϵ)-approximate Nash equilibrium on a feasible graph
G′, where cost

G′
 ≤ cost (Gα) for the Group Network Formation Game where all nodes are terminals.
The same algorithm and the proof holds for the Group Network Formation of Couples Game except that computing the
cheapest deviation does not reduce to a minimum spanning tree but to a minimum Steiner tree problem and therefore,
the best deviation of a player cannot be computed in polynomial time. But since the Steiner tree problem can be provably
approximated within a factor of 1.39 by a polynomial algorithm [6], we will use the output of this algorithm instead of the
cheapest deviation to decide the payment on the edges. Note that we obtain a network G′ with c

G′
 ≤ c (Gα) such that we
have a 1.39-approximate Nash equilibrium on G′ if the cost of its edges were decreased by γ in time polynomial in m and
ϵ−1. Similarly to the case when all nodes are terminals, the payment of each player will be increased by a factor of at most
(1+ ϵ) after the payments on the edges are raised proportionally to cover the whole cost of the edges of G′. Therefore, we
have given a polynomial-time algorithm which returns a (1.39 + ϵ)-approximate Nash equilibrium on a feasible graph G′,
where cost

G′
 ≤ cost (Gα) for the Group Network Formation of Couples Game.
Given an instance ℑ1 = (N1,G, T , F) of the Group Network Formation Game, we can obtain an instance ℑ2 =
(N2,G, T , F) of the Group Network Formation of Couples Game that has twice as many players on the same graph G, with
the same set of terminals T and the same happiness function F such that each player i ∈ N1 has 2 corresponding players
j, k ∈ N2 as illustrated in the proof of Theorem 2. The strategy pi = pj + pk is 2.78(1+ ϵ)-approximately stable for player i
since the costs of both pj and pk are within a factor of (1.39+ ϵ) of the cost of χi(pi). 
Since for all monotone functions F , finding OPT is a constrained forest problem [14], then Theorem 4 gives us a poly-time
algorithm for α = 2. In other words, we can find a (2.78 + ϵ)-approximate Nash equilibrium with cost at most 2 · OPT in
polynomial time.
6. Inapproximability results and terminal backup
Recall that in this paper, we consider games where the happiness functions are monotone. Theorem 5 shows that this
property of happiness functions is critical for even approximate stability.
Theorem 5. For the Group Network Formation Game where the happiness functions may not be monotone, there is no α-
approximate Nash equilibrium for any α.
Proof. To prove that there is no approximate Nash equilibrium for the Group Network Formation Game we give such an
instance of the problemas shown in Fig. 4(A). All nodes are player nodes.Wedefine a component to be happy if all the players
in it are happy according to the following connectivity requirements: The player on the left is happy if it is connected to at
most one other terminal. The 2 players on the right are happy if and only if they are connected to exactly 1 other terminal.
The cost of each edge is as given in Fig. 4(A), where W is very large. Observe that there is only one feasible solution of the
game, i.e., all the players are happy and where only the edge whose cost is W is purchased. The player on the left cannot
contribute to the cost of the edge in any approximateNash equilibrium since it is already happy and therefore has a deviation
of cost 0. Since the other 2 players have to be sharing the cost of W , at least one of them should be paying at least W/2.
Since that player has a deviation of cost 1, at least one of the players can reduce its cost by a factor ofW/2 by deviating and
therefore there is no α-approximate Nash equilibrium for this game where α < W/2. SinceW can be arbitrarily large and
it is independent of the number of players, there is no approximate Nash equilibrium for that instance of the general Group
Network Formation Game. 
Because of its applications to multi-homing [5,23], we are especially interested in the behavior of Terminal Backup
connectivity requirements, i.e., when a player node desires to connect to at least k− 1 other player nodes for a fixed k.
Theorem 6. For the Terminal Backup problem, with the Shapley cost-sharing (fair sharing) payment scheme, the price of stability
is at most H(2k− 2) where H(2k− 2) denotes the (2k− 2)nd harmonic number.
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Fig. 4. (A) An instance of a game where there is no approximate Nash equilibria if the happiness function is not monotone. (B) An instance of a Group
Network Formation Game where there is no approximate Nash equilibrium on OPT if the fair sharing cost-sharing mechanism is used.
1 12k – 2N
t1, t2,..., tN/2 t1, t2,..., tk–1
tk, tk+1,..., t2k–22
tN+1
,..., tN
A B
Fig. 5. (A) An instance of a Group Network Formation Game that has a Nash equilibrium whose cost is N times more than the socially optimal network.
(B) An instance of Terminal Backup problem that has a Nash equilibrium whose cost is 2k− 2 times more than the socially optimal network.
Proof. The Terminal Backup problem, under the Shapley cost-sharing model (or fair sharing), falls into a class of games
called congestion games. In this model, the strategy of a player i is just a set of edges Si that contains at least k terminals
including i, and the edges that are built are ∪iSi. The players split the cost of every edge evenly, i.e., a player i using edge
e ∈ Si must pay c(e)/xe, where xe = |{Si|e ∈ Si}|.
[3] showed that in a network design game with the Shapley-cost sharing mechanism, the cost of the Nash equilibrium
obtained by the best-response dynamics starting from OPT is at most H(n) times more expensive than OPT, where H(n)
is the nth harmonic number and n is the maximum number of players using a single edge on OPT for their connectivity
requirements. Therefore, to obtain a price of stability bound for the Terminal Backup problem, all we need to do is to select
sets Si for the players in OPT while ensuring that no edge appears in too many sets Si.
To prove the result, we need to show that we can select sets Si for the players on OPT such that no edge is used by more
than 2k−2 players.We first start by replacing all the edges of OPT by 2 directed edges.We can now form a Euler tour in each
connected component of OPT since every vertex has an equal number of incoming and outgoing edges incident to it. Then,
we ask each player i to follow the Euler tour in the clockwise direction until it encounters k− 1 other distinct terminals. We
set Si to be this set of edges. Observe that each directed edge appears in at most k − 1 sets Si belonging to distinct closest
players in the counterclockwise direction. Since each undirected edge of OPT had been replaced with 2 directed edges, each
edge of OPT is used by at most 2k− 2 sets Si. 
Theorem 7. For the Group Network Formation Game and the Terminal Backup problem, the Price of Anarchy is n and 2k − 2
respectively. Furthermore, these bounds are tight.
Proof. The price of anarchy refers to the ratio of the worst (most expensive) Nash equilibrium and the optimal centralized
solution. In the Group Network Formation Game, the price of anarchy is at most N , the number of players. This is simply
because if the worst Nash equilibrium p costs more than N times OPT, the cost of the optimal solution, then there must be
a player whose payments in p are strictly more than OPT, so he could deviate by purchasing the entire optimal solution by
himself, and form a connected component that makes her happy with smaller payments than before. More importantly,
there are cases when the price of anarchy actually equals N . This is demonstrated with the example in Fig. 5(A).
Suppose there are N players, and G consists of 2 nodes which are joined by 2 disjoint paths, one of cost 1 and and one of
cost N . Half of the players have their terminal at one node and the other half of the players have their terminal at the other
node. The only happy componentsmust include both nodes. This corresponds to Terminal backup requirementswhere every
player wants to be connected to at least N/2+ 1 terminals. Then, the worst Nash equilibrium has each player contributing
1 to the long path, and has a cost of N . The optimal solution here has a cost of only 1, so the price of anarchy is N . Therefore,
the price of anarchy could be very high in the Group Network Formation Game.
We are also interested in the price of anarchy of the Terminal Backup problem which is a special case of Group Network
Formation Games. In Fig. 5(B), we give an example where price of anarchy is 2k − 2 and we prove that this bound is tight
below. In this case, k is the connectivity requirement: components are happy if and only if they contain at least k terminal
nodes.
To prove the result all we need to do is to show that no equilibrium will cost more than 2k− 2 times OPT since Fig. 5(B)
shows an instance of a Terminal Backup problem with an equilibrium whose cost is exactly 2k− 2 times the cost of OPT.
For the purpose of contradiction, assume there is an instance of a Terminal Backupproblem that has an equilibriumwhose
cost is more than 2k− 2 times the cost of OPT. Let EEQ denote this expensive equilibrium solution. Observe that there must
exist a connected component T of OPT such that the total payments of the players of T in the expensive equilibrium solution
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EEQ is more than 2k − 2 times the cost of T . Since EEQ is a Nash equilibrium, no player in T pays more than the cost of T .
Therefore, T includes more than 2k− 2 terminals. However, as we have shown in the proof of Theorem 6, there exists a set
of edges Ci for every player i such that Ci ⊆ T , Ci contains at least k terminals including i, and every edge of T is contained in
no more than 2k− 2 sets Ci.
We define αi be the cost of Ci, which is at least the cost of connecting a player i in T to at least k − 1 other players in T .
Since no edge of T is used by more than 2k− 2 sets Ci, we know that∑i∈T αi ≤ (2k− 2) c(T )where c(T ) denotes the cost
of the component T .
However, in EEQ, the total payment of all the players in T is more than 2k − 2 times the cost of T , i.e., ∑i∈T |pi| >
(2k− 2) c(T ). Therefore,∑i∈T |pi| > ∑i∈T αi which implies that there exists a player i in T such that |pi| > αi. Therefore,
EEQ cannot be a Nash equilibrium since player i can reduce its cost to αi by deviating.
The lower bounds for Terminal Backup also hold for the general Group Network Formation Game, showing that while
the price of stability may be low, the price of anarchy can be as high as the number of players. 
Recall that congestion games, including our game with fair sharing, are guaranteed to have Nash equilibria, although
they may be expensive. The following theorem studies the quality (cost) of approximate Nash equilibrium and shows that
there may not be any approximately stable solution that is as cheap as the socially optimal network.
Theorem 8. For the Group Network Formation Game, there may not be any approximate Nash equilibriumwhose cost is as much
as OPT if the fair cost-sharing mechanism is used.
Proof. In Fig. 4(B), all nodes are player nodes. We define a component to be happy if all the players in it are happy according
to the following connectivity requirements: The large node on the left is happy always, and the 2 nodes on the right want to
connect to at least one other terminal. In OPT, the 2 players on the rightwould have to buy the edge between themwhich has
a cost ofW . When the fair sharing cost scheme is used, both of the nodes have to make a payment ofW/2 on that edge even
though the top player has a deviation of cost 1. Since the top player can reduce its cost by a factor ofW/2 by deviating, there
is no α-approximate Nash equilibrium for this gamewhere α < W/2. SinceW can be arbitrarily large and it is independent
of the number of players, there is no approximate Nash equilibrium on OPT. 
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a network formation game called the Group Network Formation Game, which captures the
essence of strategic agents building a network together. In this game, players correspond to nodes of a graph (although not
all nodes need to correspond to players), and the players can have extremely varied connectivity requirements. For example,
there might be several different ‘‘types’’ of nodes in the graph, and a player desires to connect to at least one of every type
(so that this player’s connected component forms a Group Steiner Tree [13]). Or instead, a player might want to connect to
at least k other player nodes. The first example above is useful for many applications where a set of players attempt to form
groups with ‘‘complementary’’ qualities. The second example corresponds to a network of servers where each server want
to be connected to at least k other servers so that it can have a backup of its data; or in the context of IP networks, a set of
ISPs that want to increase the reliability of the Internet connection for their customers, and so decide to formmulti-homing
connections through k other ISPs [23]. We prove that there always exists a Nash equilibrium as cheap as the socially optimal
solution, i.e., the price of stability is 1, if each node of the graph is associated with a player. For the general case, we prove
the existence of a 2-approximate Nash equilibrium as cheap as the cost of the socially optimal solution. We also present
several results concerning the existence of exact or approximate Nash equilibrium for the cases, where the players have
more general group formation requirements.
In this paper, we have assumed the monotonicity of the happiness function F , i.e., if F(S) = 1 for some set of terminals
then F(T ) = 1 for any T ⊃ S. Recall that if there is no restriction on F , then there is no approximate Nash equilibrium as
cheap as OPT. Though ourmodel is quite general and covers quite a lot of interesting applied problems, there aremany other
interesting problems that do not fit in the model. Therefore, it is of both theoretical and practical interest to investigate the
stability of group network formation with more general happiness functions.
As a starting point, let us define ‘‘monotonicity’’ from a different viewpoint. Let S and T be two arbitrary disjoint subsets
of the terminal nodes. Then F is monotone if and only if F (S ∪ T ) ≥ max{F(S), F(T )}. In other words, the union of 2 sets at
least one of which is happy is also a happy set, while the union of two unhappy sets may or may not be happy. In the rest of
the discussion, we call such functions type 1 monotone and define 2 other notions of monotonicity as illustrated in Table 1.
Our second notion of monotonicity, which we call type 2 monotone and precisely define in Table 1 tries to model the
scenarios where the players have several types and they try to form groups such that the ratio of the number of players of
any 2 types t1 and t2 is constant for each happy set. To have a better understanding of this notion of monotonicity consider
the following easy example. Each player node of the graph is colored to either red or blue and a component is happy if and
only if it has equal number of red and blue nodes. Notice that the union of 2 happy sets is always happy, the union of a happy
and an unhappy set is always unhappy while the union of two unhappy sets may or may not be happy. Notice also the set
of type 2 monotone functions are disjoint from the set of type 1 monotone functions.
Our last notion of monotonicity, which we call type 3monotone functions and define precisely in Table 1 is an extremely
general model that imposes only one restriction on the happiness functions, i.e., the union of 2 happy sets is always happy.
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Table 1
Definition of various notions of monotonicity.
Case Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
F(S) = 1, F(T ) = 1 F (S ∪ T ) = 1 F (S ∪ T ) = 1 F (S ∪ T ) = 1
F(S) = 1, F(T ) = 0 F (S ∪ T ) = 1 F (S ∪ T ) = 0 F (S ∪ T ) is free
F(S) = 0, F(T ) = 0 F (S ∪ T ) is free F (S ∪ T ) is free F (S ∪ T ) is free
Notice that, type 3 monotone functions are all functions that satisfy maximality condition [15] and therefore cannot be
approximated by the primal–dual approximation algorithm given by Goemans andWilliamson given in [14]. Therefore, it is
of interest to decide whether the Group Network Formation Game always has a Nash equilibrium if the happiness functions
are type 2 monotone or not. If so, what are the price of anarchy and the price of stability? Similarly, a natural question to
pose is whether the Group Network Formation Game always have (α, β)-approximate Nash equilibrium for small α and β
if the happiness functions are type 3 monotone or not. If so, what are the bounds on α and β?
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